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THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
AND THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
Major Thomas R. Folk 2/
I. INTRODUCTION
To what extent does the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA) i/ apply to the military departments? What impact
does the APA have on military department regulations,
adjudications, and other administrative actions, and on
judicial review of these activities? The answers to these
questions are not simple because of the many different
provisions of the APA and their varying applicability to
assorted military activities. This article briefly outlines
±/ Judge Advocate General's Corps, United States Army.
Currently assigned to the Litigation Division, Office of The
Judge Advocate General, U.S. Army, 1983 to present.
Formerly Assistant to the General Counsel of the Army,
1980-83; Trial Counsel, Officer-in-Charge, Office of the
Staff Judge Advocate, 3d Armored Division, Giessen Branch
Office, 1978-80; Infantry Platoon Leader, 4th Battalion, 6th
Infantry, Berlin Brigade, 1973-75. Distinguished Graduate,
31st Judge Advocate Officer Graduate Course, 1983;
Distinguished Graduate, 87th Judge Advocate Officer Basic
Course, 1978. Completed Infantry Officer Basic Course,
1972. J.D., University of Virginia, 1978; B.S., United
States Military Academy, 1972. Author of "Tolling of
Statutes of Limitations Under Section 205 of the Soldiers'
and Sailors' Civil Relief Act", 102 Mil. L. Rev. 157 (1983);
"Military Appearance Requirements and the Free Exercise of
Religion", 98 Mil. L. Rev. 53 (1982); "Use of Compelled
Testimony in Military Administrative Proceedings"; The Army
Lawyer, Aug. 1982, at 1; "Service of Process on Government
Officials Made Easy: Recent Changes to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure", The Army Lawyer, May 1983, at 23. Member
of the bar of the Commonwealth of Virginia.
This article first appeared in 108 Mil. L.
Rev. 135 (1985) and is reprinted here by permission.
l/ Act of June 11, 1946, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946)
(current version at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1982)).
the applicability of the various provisions of the APA to
administrative actions by the military departments. The
article first provides an overview of the APA and then
discusses the general applicability of the APA to the
military departments. Next, it discusses exemptions from
the APA that are particularly applicable to military depart-
ment activities. Finally, it discusses the specific pro-
visions of the APA applicable to military department activi-
ties and the potential impact these provisions might have on
military operations.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE APA
In the 1930's and 1940's, the size and functions
of federal administrative agencies expanded greatly. /-
This led to a growing concern about controlling the
discretion of these agencies and insuring the uniformity,
impartiality, and fairness of their procedures. 3/ As a
result of this concern, in 1946, Congress enacted the
Administrative Procedure Act.
The APA provides a set of basic procedures for use
by federal administrative agencies in carrying out their
functions. As its name implies, the Administrative Proce-
dure Act's provisions are purely procedural. It does not
provide any substantive rights 4/ nor even a jurisdictional
basis for seeking judicial review of agency actions. 5/
The various provisions of the APA are now codified
at 5 U.S.C. S 551 to 559 and 701 to 706. Basically, they
cover the following major areas of agency administrative
practice: (1) public information practices, such as publi-
cation in the Federal Register of agency organization and
2/ See, e.g., K. Davis, 1 Administrative Law Treatise
§ 1.02 (1st ed. 1958).
3/ See, e.g., United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S.
632, 644 (1950); Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 37
(1950).
4/ Hill v. United States, 571 F.2d 1098 (9th Cir. 1978).
5/ Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977).
rules; 6/ (2) public participation in rulemaking through
informaT rulemaking procedures; 7/ (3) formal rulemaking and
formal adjudication procedures; 8/ (4) basic requirements
for other miscellaneous agency administrative actions; 9/
and (5) judicial review of agency action. 10/
III. APPLICABILITY OF THE APA TO THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
The APA does not exclude the military departments
per se from its coverage. The APA applies to each "agency",
which is defined as "each authority of the Government of the
United States". 11/ Although §§ 551 and 701 exclude certain
military activities from their definition of "agency", and
thus from almost all APA coverage, they deliberately do not
exclude the military departments as organizations. The
APA's legislative history explains: "[I]t has been the
undeviating policy to deal with types of functions as such
and in no case with administrative agencies by name. "Thus
certain war and defense functions are exempted but not the
War or Navy Departments in the performance of their
functions." 12/ Courts considering the question have found
the APA applicable to the military departments except to the
6/ 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982).
7/ Id. § 553.
8/ Id. §§ 553(c), 554, 556-557.
9/ Id. § 555.
10/ Id. §§ 701-706.
i/ Id. §§ 551(1), 701(b) (1) (1982). Courts have found
this broad definition of agency to include nonappropriated
fund instrumentalities such as post exchanges. See Young v.
United States, 498 F.2d 1121 (5th Cir. 1974).
12/ Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Administrative
Procedure Act Legislative History, S. Doc. No. 248, 79th
Cong., 2d Sess. 191 (1947) (emphasis added) [hereinafter
cited as Apa Legislative History]. See also id. at 138.
extent the APA specifically exempts certain of their
functions. 13/
IV. APA EXEMPTIONS PARTICULARLY APPLICABLE TO THE MILITARY
While not excluding the military departments
generally, the APA does not apply, except for purposes of
the public information requirements in 5 U.S.C. § 552, to
"courts martial [sic] and military commissions" and "mili-
tary authority exercised in the field in time of war or in
occupied territory". 14/ In addition, the informal rule-
making 15/ and formal rulemaking and adjudication
sections 16/ of the APA exempt certain activities, including
those involving a "military function," from their coverage.
This part of the article will discuss these exemptions from
the APA.
A. Exemption of Courts-Martial and Military
Commissions
Neither the APA nor its legislative history
defines the terms "courts martial [sic]" or "military
commissions". However, under common usage, these terms have
a well understood and limited meaning. A court-martial is a
court of military or naval personnel for the trial of
offenses against military law or the law of war, 17/ the
formalities prescribed for convening courts-martial by the
13/ Roelfs v. Secretary of the Air Force, 628 F.2d 594,
59-9 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Nicholson v. Brown, 599 F.2d 639, 648
(5th Cir. 1979) Jaffe v. United States, 592 F.2d 712, 719-20
(3d Cir. 1979); Ornato v. Hoffman, 546 F.2d 10, 14 (2d Cir.
1976); United States "ex rel." Schonbrun v. Commanding
Officer, 403 F.2d 371, 375 n. 2 (2d Cir. 1968), Story v.
Marsh, 574 F. Supp. 505, 512 (E.D. Mo. 1983).
14/ 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(1) (F), (G) (1982).
15/ Id. § 553.
16/ Id. S§ 553(c), 554, 556-557.
17/ Webster's New World Dictionary 339 (1964).
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Uniform Code of Military Justice, 18/ the Manual for Courts-
Martial, 19/ and regulations 20/ make it virtually
impossible to confuse a court-martial with another type of
military tribunal. Military commissions are far less common
in military practice but still have a narrow function
similar to that of a court-martial. These tribunals are
courts
convened by military authority for the trial of persons
not usually subject to military law who are charged
with violations of the laws of war; and in places
subject to military government or martial law, for the
trial of such persons when charged with violations of
proclamations, ordinances, and valid domestic civil and
criminal law of the territory concerned. 21/
Historically, "the distinctive name of 'military commission'
has been adopted for the exclusionary war court, which
functions for the court-martial proper in time of war". 22/
Courts have followed this narrow usage in deter-
mining whether various military tribunals or boards fall
under the APA exemption for "courts martial [sic] or mili-
tary commissions". In Roeloff v. Secretary of the Air
Force, the District of Columbia Circuit held that military
discharge review boards established under 10 U.S.C. § 1553
and boards for correction of military records established
under 10 U.S.C. § 1552 did not fall under this
exemption. 23/ Similarly, in Neal v. Secretary of the
18/ 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-938 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
UCMJ].
19/ Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1984.
20/ E.g., U.S. Dep't of Army, Reg. No. 27-10, Legal
Services - Military Justice, chs. 5, 12 (1 July 1984).
21/ U.S. Dep't of Army, Reg. No. 310-25, Military
Publications--Dictionary of United States Army Terms, p. 168
(15 Sept. 1975).
22/ Roeloff v. Secretary of the Air Force, 628 F.2d 594,
599 n. 23 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (emphasis in opinion).
23/ 628 F.2d 594, 599 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
Navy, 24/ the Third Circuit found that a military
administrative board acting on re-enlistment requests was
not a court-martial or military commission under the APA.
B. Exemption of Military Authority Exercised in the
Field in Time of War or in Occupied Territory
Neither the APA nor its legislative history offer
any guidance regarding the meaning of the APA exemption for
"military authority exercised in the field in time of war or
in occupied territory". The exemption's language raises
four possible interpretational issues. What is "military"
authority under this exemption? What is "in the field"?
What does "in time of war" mean? And, what is "occupied
territory"?
Very few reported cases deal with this exemption,
and they do so briefly. For example, in Kam Koon Wan v.
E.E. Black, Ltd., 25/ the court noted briefly, in dicta,
that "the Army in Hawaii legally was not 'in the field' or
'in occupied territory' even though it acted in that manner"
in a case involving martial law in Hawaii in World War II.
Jaffe v. United States 26/ considered briefly, without
deciding, the question of whether nuclear tests conducted in
Nevada during the Korean conflict involved military
authority exercised "in the field in time of war".
These two cases offer no meaningful guidance as to
what the exemption means. Thus, one must look to the common
meaning and usage of the terms of the exemption and the
policy considerations behind the exemption to resolve the
four interpretational issues raised by it.
1. "Military Authority"
Multiple definitions and usage illustrate an
interpretational issue regarding the term "military
24/ 639 F.2d 1029 (3d Cir. 1981).
25/ 75 F. Supp. 553 (D. Hawaii 1948).
26/ 592 F.2d 712, 719-20 (3d Cir. 1979).
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authority". Does the term mean "military" in the
narrow sense of pertaining to soldiers and armies 27/
or in the broader sense of pertaining to war and
defense functions? 28/ Congress' approach in the APA
of focusing on functions rather than organizations 29/
suggests that "military" authority refers to authority
exercised in furtherance of defense and war functions,
even if exercised by civilian personnel, rather than
limiting it to authority exercised solely by uniformed
military personnel.
2. ""In the Field"
The term "in the field" is closely analogus to
language in Article 2(10), UCMJ, 30/ which subjects
persons to the UCMJ who accompany an armed force "in
the field". Under Article 2, the words "in the field"
imply military operations "with a view to an
enemy". 31/ Courts have recognized that the term
denotes activity rather than specific geographic
location. For example, in Hines v. Mikell, 32/ the
court held that forces training in temporary camps in
the United States prepatory to service in an actual
theater of war were "in the field". Similarly, courts
have found that a merchant ship and crew transporting
troops and supplies to a battle zone were "in the
field". 33/ Presumably, the same kinds of emergency
27/ See Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1432
(1961); Bonfield, "Military and Foreign Affairs Function
Rulemaking Under the APA", 71 Mich. L. Rev. 249, 257 (1972).
28/ See Bonfield, supra note 27, at 257.
29/ See, e.g., APA Legislative History, supra note 12, at
191, 250, 303.
30/ 10 U.S.C. § 802(10) (1982).
31/ 14 Op. Att'y Gen. 22 (1872).
32/ 259 F.28, 34 (4th Cir. 1919).
33/ In re Berve, 54 F. Supp. 252 (S.C. Ohio 1944); McCune
v. Kilpatrick, 53 F. Supp. 80 (E.D. Va. 1943). See also Ex
(Footnote Continued)
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considerations that allow exercise of court-martial
jurisdiction over persons "in the field," who normall
are not subject to such jurisdiction, apply to
exempting military authority from the APA's
requirements when exercised "in the field".
3. "In Time of War"
The chief potential interpretational issue
regarding the term "in time of war" is whether it
refers only to a war declared by Congress or whether
refers to other armed conflicts as well. One case
construing the term "in time of war" in Article 2(10)
UCMJ, supports a narrow interpretation. 34/ Several
cases construing the phrase "in time of war" in
Article 43, UCMJ, however, as well as its common usag,
and usage in international law, suggest a much broader
functional interpretation. 35/ This latter, functionp
interpretation is more consistent with Congress'
approach in the APA of focusing on functional
classifications. 36/
4. "Occupied Territory"
The term "occupied territory" derives its meaning
from international law, particularly the law of war.
(Footnote Continued)
parte Gerlack, 247 F.2d 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1917); Hearings on
H.R. 2998 Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Armed Serv.,
House of Representatives, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 872-73
(1949).
34/ See United States v. Averette, 19 C.M.A. 363, 41
C.M.R. 363 (1971).
35/ See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 19 C.M.A. 588,
38 C.M.R. 386 (1968); United States v. Michaud, 48 C.M.R.
379 (N.C.M.R. 1977); United States v. Reyes, 48 C.M.R. 832
(A.C.M.R. 1974); I. Brownlie, International Law and the Use
of Force by States 401 (1963).
36/ See, e.g., APA Legislative History, supra note 12, at
191, 250, 303.
Under the law of war, "occupied territory" is territory
placed under the authority of a hostile army. 37/.
Occupied territory is distinguishable from a nation's
own territory governed under martial law or from the
territory of a friendly nation administered temporarily
under a civil affairs agreement. 38/ Whether territory
is occupied is a question of fact. 39/ United States
practice is to issue an occupation proclamation,
although international law does not require this
measure. 40/ Currently, the only terri tory occupied
by the United States is West Berlin. 41/
C. Military Functions Exemption
Both 5 U.S.C. § 553, which relates to agency
rulemaking, and 5 U.S.C. § 554, which relates to formal, "on
the record," agency adjudications, exempt "military
functions" from their coverage. 42/ The APA does not define
the term "military function". One commentator has
complained that the term is "unduly vague, hard to define,
and harder yet to apply". 43/ It is clear, however, that
the term "military function" is not coextensive with all the
activities of the military departments. Congress' failure
to totally exempt the War and Navy Departments from the APA
37/ Annex to Hague Convention No. 4, Regulations
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18,
1907, art. 42, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539.
38/ U.S. Dep't of Army, Field Manual No. 27-10, The Law of
ILand Warfare, p. 139 (July 1956).
39/ Id.
40/ Id. at 140.
41/ For a discussion of Berlin's present legal status as
an occupied city, see Hillenbrand, "The Legal Background of
the Berlin Situation" in F. Hillenbrand, The Future of
Berlin (1980).
42/ 5 U.S.C. §S 553(a) (4) (1982). The exemptions refer to
"a military or foreign affairs function".
43/ Bonfield, "Military and Foreign Affairs Function
Rulemaking Under the APA," 71 Mich. L. Rev. 222 (1972).
and the APA's legislative history indicate that Congress did
not intend the term "military function" to include all
activities of the military departments. 44/ In particular,
testimony before Congress distinguished between most of the
War Department's activities, considered to be military
functions, and activities by the Army Corps of Engineers
involving navigable waters, which were considered civil
functions. 45/
Courts have broadly construed the term "military
function" to include a wide range of military department
activities outside the Corps of Engineers civil works areas.
These activities include excluding persons from a submarine
launching area, 46/ determining whether military persons
missing in action were deceased, 47/ declaring merchabt
seamen to be security risks 48/ or finding their presence on
certain American merchant vessels inimical to the national
security, 49/ determining whether doctors should be
authorized delay in entering on active duty based on
community hardship, 50/ and reviewing military
44/ See APA Legislative History, supra note 12 and
accompanying text.
45/ Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on the
Judiciary United States Senate, on S. 674, S. 675, and
S. 918, 77th Cong, 1st Sess. 35-51 (1941).
46/ United States v. Aarons, 310 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1962).
47/ McDonald v. Lucas 371 F. Supp. 837 (S.D.N.Y. 1973),
application for stay of judgment and other relief denied,
417 U.S. 905 (1974).
48/ Parker v. Lester, 112 F. Supp. 433 (N.D. Cal. 1953),
rev'd on other grounds, 227 F.2d 709 (9th Cir. 1955).
49/ McBride v. Roland, 248 F. Supp. 459 (S.D.N.Y. 1965),
aff'd 369 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1966), vacated on other grounds,
390 U.S. 411 (1968).
50/ Nicholson v. Brown, 599 F.2d 639, 648 n. 9 (5th Cir.
1979); Ornato v. Hoffman, 546 F.2d 10, 14 (2d Cir. 1976).
discharges. 51/ These decisions neither analyze the meaning
of "military function" in great detail nor give any
definition of the term.
The only in-depth analysis of the "military
function" exemption appears in a single law review article
by Professor Arthur Bonfield. 52/ Professor Bonfield argues
that, based on the "plain meaning" of the words "military"
and "function" and on the APA's legislative history, the
exemption applies to the extent that there are "clearly and
directly involved matters specifically fitted for, appropri-
ate to, or expected of the armed forces in light of their
peculiar nature and qualifications". 53/ This narrow
definition is in contrast to the broader possible definition
which would equate "military function" with "national
defense function" or "war function". 54/
The latter, broader interpretation finds stronger
support in court decisions, legislative history, longstand-
ing administrative interpretation, and congressional acquie-
sence. Several court decisions have implicitly given the
term "military function" its broadest possible
definition. 55/ The APA's legislative history refers to
wartime funcF-tons of a civilian agency as a military
function. 56/ Similarly, the Attorney General's Manual on
51/ Roeloff v. Secretary of the Air Force, 628 F.2d 594,
599 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
52/ Bonfield, "Military and Foreign Affairs Function
Rulemaking Under the APA", 71 Mich. L. Rev. 222 (1972).
53/ Id. at 257.
54/ Id. at 249.
55/ See, e.g. Roelofs v. Secretary of the Air Force, 628
F.2d 594, 599 (D.C. Cir. 1980); United States v. Aarons, 310
F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1962).
56/ APA Legislative History, supra note at 225. See also
id. at 267 (substituting word "war" for "military"
function), 355 (describing civilian defense authorities as
"pure military" functions).
the Administrative Procedure Act, 57/ published shortly
after the APA's enactment and regarded as an authoritative
administrative interpretation of the APA, L/ uses this same
illustration. 59/ Further, the Department of Defense has
repeatedly asserted to Congress that almost all its
activities fall under the "military function" exemption. §/
Courts normally defer to such longstanding
interpretations. §_/
Regardless of whether the "military function"
exemption is given the narrower interpretation urged by
Professor Bonfield or the broader interpretation given by
courts and administrative agencies, it clearly applies to
many military department regulations and adjudications. In
any event, its exact scope may be largely academic because
the other major exemptions to informal rulemaking under
§ 553 cover most military regulations. Similarly, the
formal rulemaking and adjudication procedures in §§ 556 and
557 only apply to rulemaking or adjudications "required by
statute to be made on the record after opportunity for an
agency hearings," §2/ which is not the case with most, if
5/ U.S. Dep't of Justice, Attorney General's Manual on
the Administrative Procedure Act (1947) [hereinafter cited
as Attorney General's Manual].
5/ See, e.g., G. Edles & J. Nelson, Federal Regulatory
Process: Agency Practices and Procedures 9 (1982).
5/ Attorney General's Manual, supra note 57, at 26.
AOJ House Committee on Government Operations, Survey and
Study of Administration, Organization, Procedure, and
Practice in the Federal Agencies, 85th Cong., ist Sess.,
pt. 3 (1957); Bonfield, supra note 52, at 252-53.
6_/ Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965).
2/ 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(c), 554(a) (1982). The Supreme Court,
in Wong Yong Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 50 (1950),
indicated that hearings compelled by reason of due process
are treated as "required by statute" for purposes of §§ 554,
and 556-57. However, the modern judicial trend has been to
match specific hearing elements to the circumstances rather
than apply all elements of these sections to
(Footnote Continued)
not all, military department rulemaking and adjudi-
cation. 63/
V. APPLICABILITY AND IMPACT OF SPECIFIC APA PROVISIONS ON
MILITARY ACTIVITIES
As indicated previously, the APA does apply to the
military departments generally but has two almost-blanket
exceptions for "courts martial [sic] and military com-
missions" and "military authority exercised in the field in
time of war or in occupied territory". Further, two other
APA provisions--the rulemaking requirements of 5 U.S.C.
§ 553 and the formal adjudication requirements of 5 U.S.C.
§ 554 specifically exempt "military functions" from their
requirements. This section of the article examines the ap-
plicability and potential impact of each of the five major
parts of the APA on military activities.
A. Information Practices and Regulations
Unlike other APA provisions, the information
practices provision of the APA contained in 5 U.S.C. § 552
apply to the military departments without any exception for
courts-martial or military commissions or for military
authority exercised in the field in time of war or in
occupied territory. Section 552 prescribes three ways
agencies must make information available to the general
public: (1) through publication in the Federal Regi-
ster; 64/ (2) through making final opinions available to
the pu -lic in reading rooms; 65/ and (3) through release of
other information on request. 66/
A complete treatment of the impact of § 552 on the
military departments and military activities is beyond the
(Footnote Continued)
constitutionally required hearings. See, e.g., G. Edles &
J. Nelson, Federal Regulatory Process: Agency Practices and
Procedures § 5.2 (1982).
63/ See APA Legislative History, supra note 12, at 202.
64/ 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) (1982).
65/ Id. § 552(a) (2).
66/ Id. § 552(a)(3).
scope of this article. The publication requirement is,
however, of particular importance to military regulatory
programs and the legal challenges to them because a person
need not report to, or be adversely affected by, a matter
required to be, but not, published in the Federal Register,
except to the extent the person has actual and timely notice
of it. 67/
What regulations must be published in the Federal
Register? Section 552(a) (1) requires publication "for the
guidance of the general public" of, inter alia, "substantive
rules of general applicability adopted as authorized by
law". 68/ The precise meaning of this requirement is
unclear. 69/ Courts have stated, however, that, in order
for a rule to be one of "general applicability," it must
have "a direct and significant impact upon the substantive
rights of the general public or a segment thereof". 70/
Many military regulations fall outside of this threshold
requirement for publication because they arguably are not of
"general applicability" and their publication is not needed
for "the guidance of the public". 71/ In addition, the nine
exemptions in 5 U.S.C. § 552(b), particularly exemption
(b) (2) regarding matters "related solely to the internal
personnel rules and practices of an agency," seem to provide
an alternative justification for not publishing many mili-
tary regulations in the Federal Register. 72/ Courts have
67/ Id. § 552(a) (1).
68/ Id. § 552(a)(1) (D).
69/ K. Davis, 2 Administrative Law Treatise 341 (3d ed.
1979).
70/ National Ass'n of Veterans v. Secretary of Defense,
487 F. Supp. 192, 200 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (citing Lewis v.
Weinberger, 415 F. Supp. 652, 659 (D.N.M. 1976)).
71/ Id.
72/ One might argue that the Supreme Court's decision in
Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352 (1976)
makes the (b) (2) exemption so narrow that it provides little
justification for not publishing a regulation. However,
Rose construed the (b) (2) exemption as it relates to a
(Footnote Continued)
rejected challenges to nonpublication of agency rules that,
like most of the military departments', appear to bq purely
internal and not ones of "general applicability" needed "for
the guidance of the public". 73/
Even if an agency fails to publish a regulation in
the Federal Register when required by § 552, the regulation
may still not be totally unenforceable. First, unpublished
regulatory provisions will be binding on persons having
actual and timely notice of them. 74/ Second, the unpub-
lished regulation will still be effective against persons to
the extent its nonpublication did not "adversely affect"
them. 75/ Third, the remedy available to a person challeng-
ing an unpublished regulation is not necessarily nullifica-
tion of the underlying regulation. 76/
(Footnote Continued)
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request under 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(a(3). Arguably, the policies regarding publication
under 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) are different than those relating
to release of information under FOIA. Further, in the case
of publication under § 552(a) (1), the (b) (2) exemption must
be read in conjunction with the (a) (1) requirements for
publication, i.e., "for guidance of the general public" and
"rules of general applibability".
73/ See, e.g., Pitts v. United States, 599 F.2d 1103, 1108
(ist Cir. 1979); Whelan v. Brinejar, 538 F.2d 924, 927 (2d
Cir. 1976); National Ass'n of Concerned Veterans v.
Secretary of Defense, 487 F. Supp. 192, 201 (D.D.C. 1979);
Pifer v. Laird, 328 F. Supp. 649, 652 (N.D. Cal. 1971). See
also United States v. Tolkach, 14 M.J. 239, 241 (C.M.A.
1982) (Federal Register publication not required for
military service regulations relating solely to military
personnel practices).
74/ See, e.g., United States v. Mowatt, 582 F.2d 1194 (9th
Cir. 1978); United States v. Floyd, 477 F.2d 1194 (10th Cir.
1973). But see Anderson v. Butz 550 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.
1977).
75/ See, e.g., Neighborhood & Legal Services v. Legal
Services Corp., 446 F. Supp. 1148 (D. Conn. 1979).
76/ Id.
B. APA Informal Rulemakina Procedures
Section 553 prescribes certain informal rulemaking
procedures that agencies must follow in issuing substantive
rules. The most notable of these provides the public an
opportunity to comment on a proposed rule before the rule
becomes effective. 7/ The section totally exempts two
classes of activities from its scope: "(1) a military or
foreign affairs function of the United States; or (2) a
matter relating to agency management, personnel or to public
property, loans, grants, benefits or contracts." 18/
The "military function" exemption was discussed in
8 III.C above. Most military regulations, except for those
dealing with the Army Corps of Engineers Civil Works Com-
mission, arguably fall under this exemption. 29/ In
addition, the § 553 exemption for, among other things,
matters relating to agency management, personnel, public
property, benefits, or contracts g/ provides an independent
basis for exempting almost all military regulations from
8 553.
C. APA Formal Rulemaking and Adjudication
§§ 556 and 557 prescribe procedures to be applied
to certain agency rulemaking and adjudications. These
procedures apply when rules or adjudications are "required
by statute to be made on the record after opportunity for an
agency hearing". 8J
7/ 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(c)(d) (1982).
18J Id. §5 553(a)(1)(2).
19J Agency regulations implementing 5 U.S.C. § 553 may
themselves narrow the military functions exemption. For
examples, 32 C.F.R. § 519.64(b)(2) (1983) narrows the
exemption for Department of the Army rules to matters "which
have been determined under the criteria of an Executive
Order or statute to require a security classification in the
interests of national defense or foreign policy".
@/ For a general discussion of this exemption see
Annot., 41 A.L.R. Fed. 926 (1979).
al/ 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(c), 554(a),(c) (1982).
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The formal rulemaking or adjudication procedures
of S§ 556 and 557 will rarely, if ever, apply to military
department proceedings for two reasons. First, § 554 has the
same "military function" exemption as § 553. 82/ Second,
there apparently are no statutes applicable to the Depart-
ment of Defense or the military departments that require
rulemaking or adjudications "on the record after opportunity
for an agency hearing". 83/
The courts have held that either the words "on the
record" must appear in a statute or Congress must clearly
indicate its intent to trigger the formal, on the record,
hearing provisions of the APA for S§ 556 and 557 to
apply. 84/ The fact that a statute requires a hearing does
not, by itself, necessarily trigger the procedures in these
sections. 85/ An early Supreme Court decision, Wong Yong
Sung v. Mc-Grath, indicated that the provisions of S§ 556 and
557 apply absent this exact language when due process
requires a hearing with a determination on the record. 86/
The exact reach of Wong Yong Sung is unclear, particularly
when due process requires some elements of a hearing with a
determination on the record and not other elements. 87/
82/ The APA's legislative history indicates the two
exemptions were to mirror each other. See APA Legislative
History, supra note 12, at 202, 261. See also Attorney
General's Manual, supra note 57, at 45.
83/ The APA's legislative history also notes that statutes
rarely, if ever, require military functions to be exercised
upon hearing. APA Legislative History, supra note 12, at
202, 261.
84/ See, e.g. West Chicago v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n,
701 F2d 632, 641 (7th Cir. 1983); United States Lines v.
FMC, 584 F.2d 519, 536 (D.C. Cir. 1978). See also Camp v.
Pitts, 411 U.S. 138 (1973); United States v. Florida East
Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 234-38 (1973); United States v.
Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742, 756-58 (1972).
85/ Id.
86/ 339 U.S. at 50.
87/ K. Davis, 2 Administrative Law Treatise, 333-34 (2d
ed. 1979).
However, the modern judicial trend is to not apply these
sections' procedures simply because due process requires
some aspects of a hearing on the record; 88/ more recent
Supreme Court opinions, such as Matthews v__ Eldridge, 89/
emphasize the need to tailor hearing elements to the partic-
ular circumstances. This modern trend is more consistent
with the APA's legislative history than strict application
of the provisions of §§ 556 and 557 in all instances when
due process requires some kind of hearing. 90/
D. Miscellaneous Agency Actions and Section 555
Section 555 of the APA may have the greatest
impact on military department activities. In particular,
the provisions giving a right to counsel, personal appear-
ance, and notice of reasons for denial of a petition in an
agency proceeding 91/ could potentially affect military
department administrative practice in a significant way.
Three courts have stated that § 555 applies to the
military departments. 92/ In the leading case, Roeloff v.
Secretary of the Air Force, 93/ the court held that § 555
applied to discharge review boards and boards for correction
of military records. The cburt reasoned that § 551 did not
exempt them from the APA per se since they were not "courts
martial [sic] or military commissions," and S 555 applied
"according to the provisions thereof, except as otherwise
88/ See, e.g., G. Edles & J. Nelson, Federal Regulatory
Process: Agency Practices and Procedures § 5.2 (1982).
89/ 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
90/ See APA Legislative History, supra note 12, at 21-22,
193, 202, 260, 268, 304, 315, 359.
91/ 5 U.S.C. § 555(b)(e) (1982).
92/ Roeloff v. Secretary of the Air Force, 628 F.2d 594,
599 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Nicholson v. Brown, 599 F.2d 639, 648
n. 9, (5th Cir. 1979); Wood v. Secretary of Defense, 496 F.
Supp. 199 (D.D.C. 1980).
93/ 628 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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provided by" the APA. 94/ Accordingly, the court required
the Air Force Discharge Review Board and Board for Correc-
tion of Military Records to provide a statement of reasons
under § 555(e) on why they denied a full discharge upgrade
to an applicant.
Roeloff's reasoning is logical, although one could
argue that the same "military function" exemption that
appears in §§ 553 and 554 should apply to § 555. In fact,
several courts have applied exemptions from § 554 to
§ 555. 95/ However, this approach is wholly inconsistent
with the-APA's language, 96/ its legislative history, 97/
and basic canons of statutory construction. 98/
One might also argue that a military exception to
S 555 should be implied because strict application of the
section would be inconsistent with Congress' general ap-
proach toward military personnel decisions and would lead to
absurd results. Although the Supreme Court has noted that
such exceptions to the APA "are not lightly to be
94/ Id. at 599.
95/ See Cleveland Trust Co. v. United States, 421 F.2d
475, 482 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 819 (1970);
Suess v. Pugh, 245 F. Supp. 661, 665 (N.D.W.Va. 1965).
96/ S 555 states that its provisions apply "according to
the--provisions thereof, except as otherwise provided by" the
APA. The military function exceptions in SS 553 and 554
make no reference to § 555.
97/ See APA Legislative History, supra note 12, at 194,
202, 263-267, 362.
98/ It is a basic canon of statutory construction that
expressio unius est exclusio alterius (expression of one
thing is the exclusion of another). 2 J. Sutherland,
Statutory Construction S 4915-17, at 412-23 (4th ed. 1972).
Thus Congress' express mention of military functions as
excluded from 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 554, but not from 5 U.S.C.
§ 555, arguably indicates an intent not to exclude military
functions from § 555.
presumed," 99/ there is obvious merit to this argument, as
well as support in current case law. 100/
What potential impact would application of S 555
procedures have on military administrative practice? To
answer this question requires examination of several of the
section's particular provisions.
1. Right to Counsel and to Personal Appearance
Under § 555(b).
S 555(b) provides in part:
A person compelled to appear in person before
an agency or representative thereof is entitled to
be accompanied, represented, and advised by
counsel or, if permitted by the agency, by other
qualified representative. A party is entitled to
appear in person or by or with counsel or other
duly qualified representative in an agency pro-
ceeding.
§ 555(b) thus provides two rights regarding
counsel and one regarding personal appearance.
A. Compelled Appearances
The first sentence gives a person "compelled to
appear in person" before an agency's representative a right
to be "accompanied, represented, and advised by counsel".
This right is not limited to any particular type of agency
action and thus its potential scope in the military is very
broad. Given the APA's definitions of "agency" and
99/ Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 310 (1953).
100/ Clardy v. Levi, 545 F.2d 1241 (9th Cir. 1976),
implied an exemption from the right-to-counsel requirements
of the APA for prison disciplinary proceedings. Military
interests in discipline and efficiency are much greater and
support an implied exception for military activities. See
also Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431
U.S. 666 (1977) (explaining implied exception to the Federal
Tort Claims Act for injuries incurred incident to military
service as based on concern with interference of tort suits
on military discipline).
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"person," 101/ it literally would seem to apply to any
situation in which a military member is ordered to appear
before any higher authority. This could be carried to
ridiculous extremes. For example, under the sentence's
literal language, a private would have the right to bring
counsel each time he was ordered to appear before his squad
leader or company commander. Even if not carried to this
extreme, the right certainly would literally apply to
persons ordered to appear in more formal military actions,
including service members receiving nonjudicial punishment
under summarized proceedings 102/ and before investigations
under Article 32, UCMJ 103/ and administrative
investigations. 104/
There are, however, significant limiting princi-
ples to this right to counsel. First, the right does not
require the government to provide counsel. 105/ Second, the
right only applies when a person is "compelled" to appear
and not when a person may appear as of right, but is not
compelled to do so. 106/ Third, the right may not apply to
101/ 5 U.S.C. § 551(1), (2) (1982).
102/ See U.S. Dep't of Army, Reg. No. 27-10, Leqal
Services--Military Justice, para. 3-16 (1 July 1984).
103/ 10 U.S.C.§ 832 (1982).
104/ U.S. Dep't of Army, Reg. No. 15-6, Boards,
Commissions, and Committees-Procedure for Investigating
Officers and Boards of Officers, para. 3-3 (cl, 15 June
1981), appears to give a narrower right to participation by
counsel in Army administrative proceedings than the right
granted in 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) for agency proceedings
generally.
105/ See, e.g. Grover v. United States, 200 Ct. Cl. 337
(1973); Nees v. SEC, 414 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1969); Hyser v.
Reed, 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
Thompson v. United States Board of Parole, 375 U.S. 957
(1963).
106/ See Smith v. United States, 250 F. Supp. 803 (D.N.J.
1966), appeal dismissed, 377 F.2d 739 (3d Cir. 1967); Suess
v. Pugh, 245 F. Supp. 661 (N.D.W.Va. 1965).
investigative, as opposed to adjudicatory, proceedings. 107/
Finally, the activities of counsel may be limited, as
appropriate, to the type of agency action. 108/
B. Parties to Agency Proceedings
The second sentence of § 555(b) gives a "party" a
right to appear in person or by or with counsel in an
"agency proceedings". Although this sentence does not limit
the right to counsel to compelled appearances, it has two
other explicit limitations not present in the first sen-
tence; it applies to a "party" rather than to a "person" and
it applies only to "agency proceedings". Also, despite its
plain language, courts have recognized that the right is not
absolute and depends on the nature of the proceeding. 109/
i. Party.
The APA defines "party" to include "a person or
agency named or admitted as a party, or properly
seeking and entitled as of right to be admitted as a
party, in an agency proceeding". 110/ The common
meaning of party includes "one (as a person or group)
constituting alone or with others one of the two sides
in a proceeding". I1/ The APA's legislative history
states that "[tihe word party in the second sentence is
to be understood as meaning any person showing the
requisite interest in the matter, since the section
applies in connection with the exercise of any agency
authority whether or not formal proceedings are avail-
able". 112/ These definitions would appear to include
107/ See Annot., 33 A.L.R. 229, 255 (1970).
108/ See FCC v. Schreiver, 329 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1964).
109/ See, e.g., DeVyver v. Warden, 388 F. Supp. 1213
(M.D.Pa. 1974).
110/ 5 U.S.C. § 55.1(3) (1982).
i11/ Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the
English Language, 1648 (1961).
112/ APA Legislative History, supra, note 12, at 263-64.
See also id. at 13, 205.
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applicants, respondents, or others who are the subject
of various Army administrative boards or investigations
as well as persons being offered punishment urfder
Article 15, UCMJ. 113/
ii. Agency Proceeding.
The definition of an "agency proceeding" under the
APA is a more complicated question. Section 551(12)
defines "agency proceeding" as "rulemaking", "adjudica-
tion", or "licensing". These three terms obviously do
not describe all agency activities. 114/ Thus, unless
an agency action falls under one of these three terms,
it is not subject to § 555.
The military departments do not typically engage
in rulemaking involving parties or in licensing. 115/
However, many military department activities would
appear to be considered "adjudication" under the
literal language of the APA. 116/ The APA defines
adjudication as an "agency process for formulation of
an order". 117/ In turn, it defines "order" as "the
whole or part-of a final disposition, whether affirma-
tive, negative, injunctive, or declaratory in form, of
113/ 10 U.S.C. § 815 (1982).
114/ See I.T.&T. Corp. v. Local 134, I.B.E.W., 419 U.S.
428 (1974).
115/ The APA defines licensing as "agency processing
respecting the grant, renewal, denial, revocation,
suspension, annulment, withdrawal, limitation, amendment,
nodification or conditioning of a license". 5 U.S.C.
551(8) (1982). Some military activities, such as allowing
,ommercial activities on installations, would appear to fall
ander this definition.
116/ Courts have rejected the argument that the term
adjudication is limited to the sense it is used in 5 U.S.C.
i 554/ See, e.g., Mitchell v. Sigler, 389 F. Supp. 1012,
L014-19 (N.D. Ga. 1975).
117/ 5 U.S.C. § 551(7) (1982).
an agency in a matter other than rulemaking but includ-
ing licensing". 118/
The potentially broad APA definitions of "party"
and "agency proceeding" coupled with the right to
counsel and personal appearance requirements of
§ 555(b) could have a significant effect on certain
military actions. For example, under Department of
Defense Directive 1332.14 119/ and Army Regulation
635-200, 120/ there is no express right to appear
personally or with counsel in many administrative
discharge proceedings. Instead, a "notification
procedure" applies whereby the service member receives
a written notice of proposed separation and may respond
in writing. 121/ If the service member insisted on
appearing personally with counsel before the separation
authority, must the separation authority permit this?
A literal reading of S 555(b) would indicate so.
Similarly, claims to a right to appear personally with
counsel could be made regarding complaints made under
Article 138, UCMJ, 122/ reports of survey, proceedings
under Article 15, UCMJ, 123/ applications to the
correction boards, or consideration by promotion
boards.
One might argue, however, that actions such as
initial approval of an administrative separation are
not "adjudications" because they are not "final
118/ 5 U.S.C. § 551(6) (1982).
119/ Dep't of Defense Directive No. 1332.14, Enlisted
Administrative Separations (28 Jan. 1982); 32 C.F.R. Pt. 41
(1983).
120/ Dep't of Army, Reg. No. 635-200, Personnel
Separations--Enlisted Separations (I Oct. 1982).
121/ See 32 C.F.R. S 41, App. A. at 3B (1983).
122/ 10 U.S.C. § 938 (1982).
123/ Id. § 815.
dispositions". 124/ Instead, one could argue that all
military records are eventually subject to review by a
board for correction of military records, 125/ and that
any action involving a military record is, therefore,
not a "final disposition" until the board review has
occurred. The problem with this argument is that the
APA defines "adjudication" as the "agency 'process for
the formulation of'" the "whole or part of a final
disposition". 126/ The Supreme Court did recognize in
I.T.&T. v. Local 134, I.B.E.W., that an intermediate
decision would not be considered an adjudication under
the APA when it bound no one, had no determinative
consequences for the parties, and was separate and
distinct from the actual final disposition of a
matter. 127/ However, as the court later indicated in
NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 128/ the fact that an
agency decision may be overturned on administrative
appeal does not affect its finality. The court in
Sears instead focused on whether the administrative
at--n at issue had "operative effect" without further
administrative review. 129/ Thus, the fact that
military administrative-action such as awarding an
administrative discharge is subject to appeal to a
board for correction of military records would not
affect a party's right to personal appearance and
counsel under § 555(b). The administrative action.
would still be an "agency proceeding" if it has opera-
tive effect on its own or has determinative
124/ The APA defines "adjudication" as "agency process for
formulation of an order" and order as "the whole or part of
a final disposition". 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(6), (7) (1982).
125/ Under 10 U.S.C. § 1552 (1982), Boards for Correction
of Mlitary Records (BCMR's) have authority to correct a
military record "to correct an error or remove an
injustice". The BCMR's represent the final and ultimate
military administrative remedy.
126/ 5 U.S.C. 551(b), (7) (1982) (emphasis added).
127/ 419 U.S. 428, 442 (1974).
128/ 421 U.S. 132 (1975).
129/ Id. at 158-59 n. 25.
consequences for the parties. As such, the APA right
to counsel and personal appearance, if applicable to
military proceedings, would then apply.
C. Implicit Exception
Several courts have recognized that the rights to
personal appearance or counsel under § 555(b) is not abso-
lute. Instead, they require consideration of the nature of
the proceeding. This reasoning has particular force in the
military context.
Perhaps the leading case to recognize an implicit
exemption to § 555(b) is Clardy v. Levi. 130/ In Clardy,
the Ninth Circuit held that the provisions of the APA'do not
apply to prison disciplinary proceedings. The court recog-
nized that, based on the literal language of the APA, the
argument that § 555 applied to prison disciplinary proceed-
ings was "technically impressive". 131/ Yet, the court
refused to apply the APA to prison disciplinary proceedings
because its application would "unduly inhibit prison manage-
ment". 132/
Similarly, the court in DeVyver v. Warden 133/
held that 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 555 did not apply to parole
decisionmaking despite the literal language of the APA.
Further, the court noted that, even if § 555(b) applied to
parole decisionmaking, "the affirmative right to appear
apparently bestowed by § 555(b) is not blindly absolute,
without regard to the status or nature of the proceedings
and concern for the orderly conduct of public
business". 134/
The only reported case involving the argument that
§ 555(b) applies to a military administrative proceeding is
130/ 545 F.2d 1241 (9th Cir. 1976).
131/ Id. at 1244.
132/ Id. at 1246.
133/ 388 F. Supp. 1213 (M.D.Pa. 1974).
134/ Id. at 1222.
134
Cody v. Scott. 135 Cody dealt with the separation of a
cadet from the U.S. Military Academy for misconduct. The
separation followed an investigative hearing in which the
cadet's counsel was not permitted to participate. The cadet
contended that the separation proceedings deprived him of
his right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution or by
5 U.S.C. 5 555(b). 136/ The court found no right to counsel
based on two court of appeals decisions that had failed to
find a due process right to counsel in cadet disciplinary
hearings. 137/ The court noted language from Hagopian v.
Knowlton that "[t]he importance of informality in the
proceeding militates against a requirement that the cadet be
accorded the right to representation by counsel before the
Academic Board". 138/ Although the court did not explicitly
address the literal language of § 555(b), it is apparent
that it viewed the same considerations that militated
against finding a due process right to counsel as creating
an implicit exception to § 555(b).
Judicial recognition of an implicit exception to 5
U.S.C. § 555(b) for military administrative proceedings
would be closely analogous to judicial recognition of an
implied exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act
("FTCA") 139/ for a service member's injuries incurred
incident to service. The Supreme Court has repeatedly
recognized this exception to the FTCA, known as the "Feres
doctrine," 140/ despite the FTCA's failure to mention such
an exception with other explicit exceptions applicable to
135/ 565 F. Supp. 1031 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
136/ Id. at 1034.
137/ Id. at 1034-35.
138/ Id. at 1035 (citing Hagopian v. Knowlton, 470 F.2d
201 (2d Cir. 1972)).
139/ 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1982).
140/ See Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States,
431 U.S. 666 (1977); Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135
(1950). 11C
activities by the armed forces. 141/ The most important
reason for the Supreme Court's implying the Feres "incident
to service" exception to the FTCA was its concern about the
effect that tort actions by soldiers would have on military
discipline. 142/ Similarly, strict application of § 555(b)
to the military departments would have potentially
devastating effects on military efficiency and discipline.
This is apparent since there presently are over two million
individuals in uniform in the United States and these
individuals routinely take part in many agency proceedings
without counsel or personal appearance rights and often are
compelled to appear before agency authorities without
counsel.
2. Right to Notice of Denial and Statement of
Reasons under § 555(e).
Section 555(e) provides in part:
(e) Prompt notice shall be given of the denial in
whole or in part of a written application,
petition, or other request of an interested person
made in connection with any agency proceedings.
Except in affirming a prior denial or when the
denial is self explanatory, the notice shall be
accompanied by a brief statement of the grounds
for denial.
Basically, this provision requires an agency to
give a brief statement of its reasons when it denies a
person's written request in connection with an agency
proceeding. 143/ The section's legislative history indi-
cates that such a "brief statement" must be "sufficient to
141/ See Jacoby, "The Feres Doctrine," 24 Hastings L.J.
1281, 1282-85 (1973).
142/ See, e.g., Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United
States, 431 U.S. 666, 671-673 (1977); Note, "In Support of
the Feres Doctrine and A Better Definition of 'Incident to
Service,'" 56 St. John's L. Rev. 584, 500-04 (1982).
143/ See generally Annot., 57 A.L.R. Fed. 765 (1982).
appraise the party of the basis of the denial". 144/ Courts
have applied the requirements of § 555(e) in a number of
contexts, most notably to parole board decisions. 145/
The main limitation on this section is that it
applies only to denials, of written applications, petitions
or requests, of an interested person, in connection with an
agency proceeding. The APA itself does not define "inter-
ested person". However, the Attorney General's Manual on
the Administrative Procedure Act 146/ states that an "inter-
ested person" may "be defined generally as one whose inter-
ests are or will be affected by the agency which may result
from the proceeding". 147/ As indicated previously in the
discussion of § 555(b), the term "agency proceeding" is
quite broad and would extend to any agency process for the
formulation of the whole or part of a final agency disposi-
tion in a matter.
The actual burden that § 555(e) imposes is slight.
The section requires only a brief statement. Pursuant to
the stipulation of dismissal and the settlement agreement in
Urban Law Institute of Antioch College, Inc. v. Secretary of
Defense, 148/ boards for correction of military records and
discharge review boards already give far more extensive
explanations for their decisions than required by § 555(e).
Similarly, the Army provides statements of reasons regarding
denial of complaints under Article 138, UCMJ which are
indexed and made available to the public pursuant to the
settlement in Hodge v. Alexander. 149/ It seems unlikely
that application of the requirement to other military
144/ APA Legislative History, supra note 12, at 265;
Nttorney General's Manual, supra note 57 at 70.
145/ See, e.g., King v. United States, 492 F.2d 1337 (7th
Cir. 1974).
146/ Attorney General's Manual, supra note 57.
147/ Id. at 70.
148/ No. 76-0530 (D.D.C. stipulation of dismissal filed
Jan. 31, 1977) (order and settlement agreement July 30,
L982).
149/ No. 77-228 (D.D.C. May 13, 1977).
contexts would impose any significant burden. If, in fact,
imposition of the requirement would significantly burden a
military proceeding, then, arguably, the requirement should
not apply. 150/
E. Judicial Review
The APA's provisions on judicial review are
codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706. Congress intended these
provisions to restate the law as it existed rather than
establish new standards. 151/
Section 701 sets out the applicability of the
APA's provisions on judicial review. As mentioned
previously, because of the definition of "agency," "courts
martial (sic] and military commissions" and "military
authority exercised in the field in time of war or in
occupied territory" are not reviewable under the APA.
Section 701 also indicates that the judicial review
provisions of the APA are not applicable to the extent that
"(1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action
is committed to agency discretion by law". 152/ There do
not appear to be any presently existing statutes that
preclude judicial review of any military department's
action. 153/ However, the phrase "agency action is
committed to agency discretion by law" includes the concepts
of nonjusticiability and nonreviewability. 154/
150/ Cf. Roelofs v. Secretary of the Air Force, 628 F.2d
594, 601 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (justifying decision to require
statement of reasons in part on fact that requirement
imposed no significant burden on the military). See also
supra text accompanying notes 129-41.
151/ Attorney General's Manual, supra, note 57, at 93.
152/ 5 U.S.C. §§ 701(a) (1), (2)) (1982).
153/ Some actions regarding national defense policy,
however, are statutorily exempt from judicial review. See,
e.g., 50 U.S.C. S§ 47(b), pp. 1216(6) (1982).
154/ See, e.g., United States "ex rel." Schonbrun v.
Commanding OFficer, 403 F.2d 371 (2d Cir. 1968).
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Section 702, concerning right of review under the
APA, is significant to the military departments because of
its waiver of sovereign immunity for nonmonetary claims
against agencies. 155/ All circuits considering the ques-
tion have not recognized that the section's waiver applies
to "nonstatutory" APA review of agency action under general
federal question jurisdiction. 156/ However, courts recog-
nize that this waiver does not apply to a suit that would
work an intolerable burden on government operations. 157/
In addition, § 702 provides that it does not confer "author-
ity to grant relief if any other statute that grants consent
to suit expressly or impliedly forbids the relief which is
sought". 158/ Further, the Second Circuit has indicated
that the waiver does not apply when Congress has established
an exclusive scheme for judicial review of agency
activity. 159/ Finally, the waiver of sovereign immunity in
§ 702 should not apply to activities such as courts-martial,
military commissions, and military authority exercised in
the field in time of war, which are not within the APA's
judicial review provisions.
Sections 702 and 705 cover common concepts of
judicial review such as standing, ripeness, and relief
pending review. Their provisions do not appear to raise any
special considerations for review of military department
activities.
155/ See Act of October 21, 1976, S 1, Pub. L. No. 94-574,
90, Stat. 2721.
156/ Sprecher v. Graber, 716 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1983);
Schnapper v. Foley, 667 F..2d 102, 107 (D.C. Cir. 1981);
Sheehan v. Army & Air Force Exchange Service, 619 F.2d 1132,
1138-39 (5th Cir. 1980, rev'd on other grounds, 456 U.S. 728
(1982); Jaffe v. United States, 592 F.2d 712 (3d Cir. 1979);
Hill v. United States, 571 F.2d 1098, 1102 (9th Cir. 1978).
157/ See, e Groves & Sons, Co. v. United States, 495
F. Supp_ 201D. Colo. 1980) (no waiver under S 702 where
remedy for contract dispute existed under the Tucker Act).
158/ See, e.g., McCartin v. Norton, 674 F.2d 1317, 1322
(D.C. Cir. 1982).
159/ Sprecher v. Graber, 716 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1983).
Section 705 covers the scope of judicial review of
agency adtions. This section provides in part that a
reviewing court shall:
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action,
findings, and conclusions found to be--
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power,
privilege, or immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction,
authority, or limitations, or short of statutory
right;
(D) without observance of procedure required
by law;
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a
case subject to §S 556 and 557 of this title or
otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency
hearing provided by statute; or
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent
that the facts are subject to trial de novo by the
reviewing court.
One area in which judicial review differs from the
language of the APA is in review of the adequacy of the
record supporting a military department's denial of consci-
entious objector status. The language of § 706(2) would
indicate an arbitrary and capricious standard applies. 160/
160/ The "substantial evidence" standard only applies "in
a case subject to sections otherwise reviewed on the record
of an agency hearing 'provided by statute'". 5 U.S.C. S 706
(1982) (emphasis added). Inservice conscientious objector
determinations are not made under any statutory mandate,
they are purely regulatory. See 32 C.F.R. S 75 (1983).
Absent a statutory "on the reco-rd" hearing requirement, the
"arbitrary or capricious" standard applies. See Camp v.
Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 140-42 (1973); Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 414-15 (1971).
In fact, courts almost universally apply a narrower "basis-
in-fact" test, 161/ described as the narrowest standard
known to judicial review. 162/ The Fifth Circuit, in
Nicholson v. Brown, 163/ has adopted this narrower standard
for judicial review of other internal military activities.
The standards for the scope of judicial review
established by § 706 create some special problems when the
review is of informal agency action, as is often the case
with the military departments. Because many military
department actions are not covered by the rulemaking or
adjudication provisions of the APA, they are done informally
without any detailed administrative record to justify them.
Even when there is an administrative record, it may be
incomplete. How then is a court to review such actions in
the absence of a detailed or complete record? If courts
would always require exhaustion of administrative remedies,
if a formal administrative remedy existed for every
potential claim against the military, and if the admin-
istrative remedy created a complete administrative record,
this would not be a problem. Courts simply would review the
complete administrative record created by an agency, such as
the boards for correction of military records. Unfortunate-
ly, however, some courts do review claims without requiring
exhaustion of administrative remedies and some administra-
tive actions result in less than complete administrative
records. What then?
Two Supreme Court cases, Camp v. Pitts 164/ and
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 165/ provide the
standard for review of such informal agency actions and
address the question of an inadequate administrative record.
These cases indicate that an "arbitrary and capricious"
standard applies to review of agency action, absent a
statutory, "on-the-record," hearing requirement. Further,
in limited circumstances, the court has called for agency
161/ See Annot., 10 A.L.R. Red. 15, at §S 12, 13 (1972).
162/ See Estep v. United States, 321 U.S. 114 (1946).
163/ 599 F.2d 639 (5th Cir. 1979).
164/ 411 U.S. 138 (1973).
165/ 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
supplementation of an inadequate agency record. Courts have
supplemented inadequate administrative records through
remand, use of affidavits, evidentiary hearings involving
agency officials, or allowing limited discovery. 166/
V. CONCLUSION
The APA does not exempt the military departments
in general from its provisions. It does contain almost
blanket exceptions for "courts martial (sic] and military
commissions" and "military authority exercised in the field
in time of war". Further, it exempts military functions
from its rulemaking and formal adjudication provisions.
While these exemptions are significant, there are
several important requirements that the APA may impose on
military administrative actions. First, the military
departments must publish "substantive rules of general
applicability" in the Federal Register "for guidance of the
general public". Second, one could argue that the literal
language of the APA requires the military departments to
allow military members to be represented by counsel whenever
they.are compelled to appear before a military department
representative or to appear personally and with counsel when
they have an interest at stake in a military administrative
action. However, a strong argument exists that there is an
implicit exception to these requirements for the military.
Third, the literal language of the APA, as interpreted by
the courts, requires the military departments to provide a
brief statement of reasons when they deny certain adminis-
trative requests. In addition to these requirements, the
APA provides the standards of review for most judicial
challenges to military administrative actions.
The area of the greatest potential litigation and
development in military administrative practice involves the
APA's rights to counsel, personal appearance, and notice of
reasons for denial set out in 5 U.S.C. S 555. Courts have
begun to apply the notice of reasons for denial requirements
of S 555(e) to some military administrative actions. To
date, courts have not applied the requirements of S 555(b)
166/ See generally McMillan & Peterson, "The Permissible
Scope of Hearings, Discovery, and Additional Factfinding
During Judicial Review of Informal Agency Action," 1982 Duke
L.J. 333.
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regarding counsel and personal appearance to the military.
Whether courts will do so, based on the section's literal
language, or, instead, imply an exemption for the military
because of concerns with discipline and effectiveness,
remains to be seen.
